- POWER INDICES AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE by Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle
POWER INDICES AND THE VEIL OF
IGNORANCE
Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano
WP-AD 2000-13
Correspondence to A. Laruelle: Universidad de Alicante, Campus de SanVicente, E-03071
Alicante, Spain. (e-mail: laruelle@merlin.fae.ua.es).
Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Econ¶ omicas, s.a.
First Edition June 2000.
Dep¶ osito Legal: V-2092-2000
IVIE working papers o®er in advance the results of economic research under way in order to
encourage a discussion process before sending them to scienti¯c journals for their ¯nal publication.
* We want to thank M. Maschler and J. M. Zarzuelo for their insightful comments. This research
has been supported by the Training and Mobility of Researchers programme initiated by the European
Commission, by the IVIE, and by the DGES of the Spanish Ministerio de Educaci¶ on y Cultura, under
project PB96-0247.
* A. Laruelle: Universidad de Alicante. F. Valenciano: Universidad del Pa¶ is Vasco.
1POWER INDICES AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE
Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano
Abstract
We provide an axiomatic foundation of the expected utility preferences over lotteries
on roles in simple superadditive games represented by the two main power indices, the
Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index, when they are interpreted as von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions. Our axioms admit meaningful interpretations in the setting
proposed by Roth in terms of di®erent attitudes toward risk involving roles in collective
decision procedures under the veil of ignorance. In particular, an illuminating interpre-
tation of "e±ciency", up to now missing in this set up, as well as of the corresponding
axiom for the Banzhaf index, is provided.
Key words: Power indices, voting power, collective decision-making, lotteries, expected
utility
21I N T R O D U C T I O N
In the literature, decision-making procedures are often modeled as simple games by as-
signing worth 1 to coalitions with the capacity of passing a decision and 0 to the others. In
this framework, measures have been developed in order to assess the ap r i o r idistribution
of power among the players, that is, their capacity to in°uence the outcome of a vote. The
two best known power indices are the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index and the Banzhaf (1965)
index. Both indices can be interpreted either as a measure axiomatically grounded or as a
probability. In the ¯rst approach, each power index is interpreted as the unique measure
embodying a set of properties that characterize it. Since Dubey's (1975) ¯rst axiomati-
zation of the Shapley-Shubik index on the domain of simple games and that of Dubey
and Shapley (1979) of the Banzhaf index, several axiomatization have been proposed in
the literature. However, most axiomatizations of these indices pay little attention to the
compellingness or even to the meaning of the axioms in terms of the voting situations un-
derlying simple games. Alternatively, in the second approach, the value of both indices for
a player in a game is interpreted as the ap r i o r iprobability of that player being a swinger
in the coalition passing a decision that is made according to the voting rules modeled by
that game. Either index, as any semivalue (Weber (1988), Einy (1987)), emerges then
from di®erent probabilistic assumptions about this coalition (see also Stra±n (1977)). In
fact, the axiomatic and the probabilistic approaches are complementary interpretations
that do not ¯t clearly with each other, as pointed out by Blair and McLean (1990), who
propose an axiomatic foundation for the probabilistic approach.
In this paper we consider a third interpretation, that was proposed by Roth (1977b,
see also 1988), without attracting so far much attention in the literature. In this approach
power indices are interpreted as utility functions representing von Neumann-Morgenstern
preferences over the set of lotteries on positions or roles in collective decision-making
procedures. In other words, the value that an index attaches to position i in game v is
just a means to allow comparisons of the capacity to in°uence the outcome in position
i in a vote cast according the rules described by v; with the capacity attached to other
positions in other voting rules or even random mixtures of them. Under this point of view,
what matters of the information provided by an index are the von Neumann-Morgenstern
preferences it represents. Consequently, in this sense an index is equivalent to any positive
a±ne transformation of it. In Laruelle and Valenciano (1999) we provide an axiomatization
of both power indices up to the choice of a zero and a unit of scale, that is, exactly the
natural degrees of indeterminacy for a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. It turns
out that all our axioms in (1999) admit a direct translation into Roth's setting. As a result
3an axiomatization in this setting emerges in which our axioms acquire a clear interpretation
in terms of attitudes toward risk involving roles in collective decision procedures. In
particular, several alternatives to Roth's "neutrality to ordinary risk", a direct translation
of Dubey's (1975) "transfer", are provided. While his obscure "neutrality/aversion to
strategic risk" that di®erentiates either index is replaced by an illuminating interpretation
of "e±ciency", up to now missing in this set up, as well as of the corresponding axiom for
the Banzhaf index, in terms of attitudes toward risk involving roles in collective decision
procedures under the veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1972) with respect to the role to play.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic game theoretical background
is given along with a summary of our characterization of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf
indices in Laruelle and Valenciano (1999). In Section 3 Roth's (1977b) setting and char-
acterization are brie°y reviewed. In Section 4 we translate the axioms reviewed in Section
2 to Roth's setting, where a new characterization is provided. Finally Section 5 concludes
with a brief discussion emphasizing the main conclusions of this work and some lines for
further research.
2 SHAPLEY-SHUBIK AND BANZHAF INDICES UP A
ZERO AND A UNIT
A cooperative transferable utility (TU) game is a pair (N;v), where N = f1;:::;ng denotes
the set of players and v a function which assigns a real number to each non-empty subset
or coalition of N,a n dv(;)=0 . W h e nN is clear from the context, we will refer to
game (N;v) as game v. The number of players in a coalition S is denoted s.Ag a m ei s
monotonic if v(T) ¸ v(S) whenever T ¶ S.I ti ssuperadditive if v(S [ T) ¸ v(S)+v(T)
whenever S \ T = ;.
A (0-1)-game i sag a m ei nw h i c ht h ef u n c t i o nv only takes the values 0 and 1. It is a
simple game if it is not identically 0; and monotonic. In this context, the superadditivity
property is equivalent to the condition: v(S)+v(N n S) · 1 for all S ½ N.L e t SGn
denote the set of all simple superadditive n-person games. The following de¯nitions refer
to games in SGn. A coalition S is said to be winning in game v if v(S) = 1, and is losing
if v(S) = 0. A winning coalition is minimal if it does not contain any other. In game v;
W(v)( r e s p . ,M(v)) will denote the set of winning (resp., minimal winning) coalitions in
v. Any of these sets, W(v)o rM(v), fully characterizes the game v.Ap l a y e ri is said to
be a swinger in a coalition S if S is winning and S nf ig is not. A null player in a game v
is a player i who is never a swinger, that is, v(S)=v(S nf ig) for all S.
As a collective decision-making procedure is speci¯ed by the voting body and the
4decision rules, it can be modeled by a (0-1)-game whose winning coalitions are those that
can make a decision without the vote of the remaining players. We assume that the
decision rules are consistent in the following sense. The unanimity of the players can
make a decision. Any subgroup of a group of voters that cannot make a decision cannot
either. Two nonintersecting groups of voters cannot make decision at the same time.
Under these conditions a voting procedure can be described as a simple superadditive
game. Notwithstanding, note that such a voting procedure is fully speci¯ed by the list
of winning coalitions, and any assumption concerning the meaning of the numerical 0/1
values of the game is unnecessary and unjusti¯ed. In particular the assumption, common
in the TU context, that the value of a coalition S represents the utility that the members
of S can distribute among themselves is out of place here.
For any coalition S µ N,t h eS-unanimity game, denoted (N;uS), is the simple game
uS(T)=
(
1i f T ¶ S
0o t h e r w i s e .
Player i's dictatorship is thus denoted by ufig. For any game v 2 SGn such that v 6=
uN, and any S 2 M(v), the modi¯ed game v¤
S i st h eg a m es u c ht h a tW(v¤
S)=W(v)nfSg.
Avoiding starting from the unanimity game and dropping a minimal winning coalition
guarantee that v¤
S 2 SGn. In terms of decision-making procedures, the modi¯ed game
v¤
S represents the new procedure that results from the modi¯cation of a decision-making
rules in such a way that one and only one coalition that previously could make a decision
cannot any more.
A power index is a function © : SGn ! Rn that associates with each simple superad-
ditive game v av e c t o ro rp o w e rp r o ¯ l e© ( v)w h o s eith component is interpreted as an a
priori measure of the in°uence that player i can exert on the outcome when decisions are
to be made according to the decision rule described by v. To evaluate the distribution of
power among the players the two best known power indices are the Shapley-Shubik (1954)





(s ¡ 1)!(n ¡ s)!
n!
(v(S) ¡ v(S nf ig));i =1 ;:::;n:







(v(S) ¡ v(S nf ig));i =1 ;:::;n:
The Shapley-Shubik index was ¯rst axiomatized by Dubey (1975). A similar axioma-
tization of the Banzhaf index sharing three out of four axioms was given by Dubey and
Shapley (1979).
5The main purpose of these or any other measure of power is to allow comparisons of the
players' capacity to in°uence the outcome in the same or in di®erent voting procedures.
Moreover, as already pointed out above, the only relevant information in a decision-making
procedure is the list of winning coalitions. Therefore a power index should be based on
this information, and should not attribute any importance to the particular numerical 0/1
values of the characteristic function used to describe it. These considerations took us to
propose in Laruelle and Valenciano (1999) a characterization consistent with this idea.
More precisely, avoiding any normalizing ingredients in our axioms we characterized both
indices up to the choice of a zero and a unit. We now summarize our axiomatization, ¯rst
reviewing our axioms, for we only share anonymity with previous characterizations in the
literature.
Anonymity (An): For all v 2 SGn; any permutation ¼ of N,a n da n yi 2 N,
©i(¼v)=© ¼(i)(v);
where (¼v)(S): =v(¼(S)).
This axiom states that the measure of power does not depend on how the players are
labeled.
Null Player (NP): For all v 2 SGn,a n da l li 2 N;
i is a null player in v , for all w 2 SGn; ©i(v) · ©i(w):
The axiom states that being a null player is the (strictly, mind the equivalence) worst
role any player can play, the role that yields a minimal measure of power.
Transfer (T): For any v;w 2 SGn; and all S 2 M(v) \ M(w)( S 6= N):
©i(v) ¡ ©i(v¤
S)=© i(w) ¡ ©i(w¤
S)( 8i 2 N):
This axiom, equivalent to the usual transfer, postulates that the e®ect (gain or loss) on
any player's power of eliminating a single minimal winning coalition from the set of winning
ones is the same in any game in which this coalition is minimal winning. In Laruelle and
Valenciano (1999) we also show that this axiom can be replaced in the characterizing
theorem by the following weaker (under anonymity) assumption.
Symmetric Gain-Loss (SymGL): For all v 2 SGn,a l lS 2 M(v)( S 6= N), and all
i;j 2 S (resp., i;j 2 N n S), ©i(v) ¡ ©i(v¤
S)=© j(v) ¡ ©j(v¤
S).
6The axiom states that the e®ect of eliminating a minimal winning coalition is the same
f o ra n yt w op l a y e r sb e l o n g i n gt oi ta n da l s of o ra n yt w op l a y e r so u t s i d ei t . F i n a l l y ,o u r
di®erentiating axioms for the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index are respectively:






















Total (resp., average) gain-loss balance postulates that the total (resp., average) loss
of the players in a minimal winning coalition equals the total (resp., average) gain of the
players outside it, when this coalition is eliminated from the list of winning coalitions.
Now, denoting 1 :=( 1 ;:::;1) 2 Rn; we have the main result in Laruelle and Valenciano
(1999): our axioms characterize both indices are up to the choice of a zero and a unit of
scale for the measure of power.
Theorem 1 (Laruelle and Valenciano, 1999) Let ©:SGn ! Rn; then
(i) © satis¯es anonymity, null player, symmetric gain-loss (or transfer) and total gain-
loss balance if and only if it is ©=®Sh + ·1,f o rs o m e®>0 and · 2 R.
(ii) © satis¯es anonymity, null player, symmetric gain-loss (or transfer) and average
gain-loss balance if and only if it is ©=®Bz + ·1,f o rs o m e®>0 and · 2 R.
3 ROTH'S SETTING AND RESULTS
Let L(SGn £ N)d e n o t et h es e to flotteries on SGn £ N. That is, the set of distributions
of probability on the set SGn £N1.Ap a i r( v;i) in this set is interpreted as the prospect
of the event "playing role i in game v". Any power index © : SGn ! Rn determines a
preference ordering on L(SGn £ N), the one represented by the expected utility function
associated to ' : SGn £ N ! R; de¯ned by '(v;i): =© i(v): A n ys u c ha no r d e r i n gw i l l
rank all possible roles in all possible games, as well as lotteries on them. This is the setting
proposed by Roth (1977b, 1988), in which the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices are
reinterpreted as utility functions representing risk preferences. This interpretation implies
a point of view beyond that of any particular player. There are no players in fact, just
1We assume SGn £ N ½ L(SGn £ N) by identifying at all e®ects the sure event (v;i) and the lottery
that assigns probability one to this event.
7"positions" in games or "roles", hence the more appropriate expression in this context
"playing role i in game v". In this setting Roth investigates the attitudes toward risk that
underlie and characterize the preferences associated to either index. But before proceeding
with Roth's results we need some notation.
A lottery on SGn£N can be represented by a map l : SGn£N ! R; such that (i) for all





l(v;i)=1 ; where l(v;i) is the probability
of playing role i in game v.G i v e n l;l0 2 L(SGn £ N), and ¸ 2 [0;1];¸ l© (1 ¡ ¸)l0
will denote the lottery such that (¸l © (1 ¡ ¸)l0)(v;i): =¸l(v;i)+( 1¡ ¸)l0(v;i): That
is, ¸l © (1 ¡ ¸)l0 can be interpreted as a second order lottery that assigns probabilities ¸
and 1 ¡ ¸ to l and l0 respectively. Any "convex combination" of lotteries can be de¯ned
similarly. With this notation, for instance, 1
2(v;i) © 1
2(w;j) will denote the lottery that
gives one half to playing role i in game v and one half to playing role j in game w: The
support of a lottery l is the set sup(l): =f(v;i) 2 SGn £ N s.t. l(v;i) > 0g: Two special
kinds of lotteries will play an important role. On the one hand, lotteries in which the
game to be played is sure but the role is random. In particular ©i2N
1
n(v;i) will denote the
lottery that assigns the same probability 1
n to all roles in game v.A l s o ,f o ra n yS ½ N,
we will write ©i2S
1
s(v;i) with obvious similar meaning. On the other hand, lotteries in
which the game to be played is random but the role is sure will be used too. Such lotteries
can be expressed consistently with the former notation like this ©v2SGnl(v;i)(v;i), if role
i is sure.
We now formulate Roth's assumptions relative to an ordering ¹ in L(SGn £ N)t h a t
permitted him to single out the speci¯c ones associated to Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf
indices. The indi®erence relation associated to ¹ will be denoted "»".
De¯nition 1 A binary relation ¹ is a von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) preference2
ordering on L(SGn £ N),i ft h e r ee x i s t sam a p' : SGn £ N ! R; whose associated






that is, l ¹ l0 if and only if ¹ '(l) · ¹ '(l0):
R1: For all (v;i) 2 SGn £ N; any permutation ¼ of N,a n da n yi 2 N,
(¼v;i) » (v;¼i):
R2: For all (v;i) 2 SGn £ N; if v0 denotes the 0-game s.t. v0(S) = 0 for all S;
(i) (v0;i) ¹ (v;i) ¹ (ufig;i):
(ii) i is a null player in v ) (v0;i) » (v;i) Á (ufig;i):
2See von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 1947, 1953) and also Herstein and Milnor (1953) for its
axiomatic foundation.




2(v _ w;i) © 1
2(v ^ w;i):
Neutrality to strategic risk: For any S µ N; and all i 2 S;
(uS;i) » 1
s(ufig;i) © (1 ¡ 1
s)(v0;i):
Banzhaf-aversion to strategic risk: For any S µ N; and all i 2 S;
(uS;i) » 1
2s¡1(ufig;i) © (1 ¡ 1
2s¡1)(v0;i):
Then Roth's characterizations can be restated like this omitting the straightforward
normalizing requirements to get precisely Sh and Bz3:
Theorem 2 (Roth 1977b, 1988) The only von Neumann-Morgenstern preference or-
dering on L((SGn [f v0g) £ N) that satis¯es conditions R1, R2, neutrality to ordinary
risk and neutrality to strategic risk (resp., Banzhaf-aversion to strategic risk) is the one
represented by the utility function sh(v;i): =Shi(v) (resp., bz(v;i): =Bzi(v)).
Some remarks are worth here. First, note that "R1" corresponds to the traditional
"anonymity" in the usual set up, while "neutrality to ordinary risk" is the direct translation
of Dubey's transfer axiom. As to condition "R2", that unnecessarily uses the nonsimple
zero-game v0, is an awkward translation of traditional "null player" including some addi-
tional plausible ingredients. The role of the di®erentiating axioms is played by "neutrality
to strategic risk" and a form of "aversion to strategic risk". But the translation of these two
axioms from the preferences setting back into usual set up is the following. The ¯rst one's
counterpart would be just assuming that for any S-unanimity game ©i(uS)=1
s = Shi(uS):
As to the second, its counterpart would be just assuming that for any S-unanimity game
©i(uS)= 1
2s¡1 = Bzi(uS): This is just imposing the "right" value of the index for the una-
nimity games in either case. In other words, the counterparts of these axioms in the usual
set up are rather ad hoc assumptions that would permit to derive directly either index
3In Roth (1977a) he ¯rst reinterprets and axiomatizes the Shapley value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function representing preferences over lotteries on positions in superadditive TU games. Then, in
(1977b), he adapts his axiomatization for recasting Dubey's (1975) characterization of the Shapley-Shubik
index into the domain of lotteries on positions in simple superadditive games, and also characterizes in this
setting both the "raw" ("nonnormalized" in his terms) and normalized Banzhaf in this domain. Finally, in
(1988), he presents a synthesis integrating both papers in which also characterizes the Banzhaf semivalue
i nt h i sf r a m e w o r ka n dt h ec h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n sa r ea d a p t e dt ot h ec a s eo fs i m p l eg a m e s .A l t h o u g ht h i so n l y
done for the Shapley-Shubik index, a similar adaptation for the Banzhaf semivalue is straightforward.
9by just assuming, in addition, null player and transfer, so making super°uous anonymity
and e±ciency or the corresponding di®erentiating axiom for Banzhaf. Moreover, Roth's
interpretation of these axioms on "strategic" grounds, however appealing at ¯rst sight, are
particularly misleading in his set up. In either case, the condition and its game-theoretic
°avored name, is explained in the following terms. Both axioms postulate the indi®erence
between a certain gamble involving playing the dictator role or playing the zero-game,
and the sure membership of the unique minimal winning coalition in the S-unanimity
game uS. Roth's interpretation is that playing the game uS involves a certain "strategic"
(rather than probabilistic, for no gamble is involved) risk. Thus: "..the two indices re°ect
di®erent attitudes toward the relative bene¯ts of engaging in strategic interaction with
other players in games of the form uS:" This game-theoretical explanation does not make
sense in a context in which no strategic consideration, nor even players are involved. We
¯nd it contradictory with the most interesting and illuminating interpretation of Roth's
setting.
4 BEHIND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE
In our view, the only consistent interpretation of Roth's setting is that what matters is the
preference ordering on roles in voting rules when one is uncertain with respect to the role
to be played. That is, in the more suitable and suggestive Rawls' (1972) terms, "under
the veil of ignorance". It is in these terms that all axioms should be interpreted. Then the
following assumptions are the result of translating into the present framework the axioms
reviewed in Section 2, used by us in Laruelle and Valenciano (1999) to characterize the
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices up to a zero and a unit in SGn: Namely, in what
follows all assumptions refer to a preference ordering ¹ on L(SGn £ N)( f o rw ew i l ln o t
use the zero-game). In order to make it clearer this correspondence we use the same
names, full or abbreviated, just adding one asterisk.
Anonymity* (An*): For all (v;i) 2 SGn £N; any permutation ¼ of N,a n da n yi 2 N,
(¼v;i) » (v;¼i);
where (¼v)(S): =v(¼(S)).
This is just Roth's R1, the only axiom common to his characterization and ours.
Null Player* (NP*): For all (v;i) 2 SGn £ N;
i is a null player in v , for all w 2 SGn; (v;i) ¹ (w;i):
10This axiom is the direct translation of our null player (NP): The role of null player is
the worst (strictly) that can be attached to any position i.















This axiom postulates the indi®erence, whenever the position i is sure and S is a
minimal winning coalition of games v and w, between the lottery that gives identical
probabilities to play v or w¤
S and the lottery that gives identical probability to play v¤
S
or w. Note that this axiom, a direct translation of our transfer (T), is equivalent to
Roth's (1977b, 1988) "neutrality to ordinary risk" though the involved games are simpler.
Observe that for any reasonable preference, if i 2 S (if i 2 N nS the preferences should be
reversed); (v;i) Â (v¤
S;i)a n d( w¤
S;i) Á (w;i), then the assumption expresses the intensity
of these desirability comparisons.
As we will show, also in this framework transfer* can be replaced by the following sim-
pler (and weaker under anonymity*) condition that results from translating our symmetric
gain-loss into this setting.
Symmetric Gain-Loss* (SymGL*): For all v 2 SGn,a l lS 2 M(v)( S 6= N), and all















The axiom postulates the indi®erence between the lottery that gives identical prob-
ability to role i in v and to role j in v¤
S and the lottery that gives identical probability
to role j in v and to role i in v¤
S,g i v e nt h a tb o t hp l a y e r si and j are either both in the
minimal winning coalition S dropped or both outside it. Now, as for any reasonable pref-
erence, if i;j 2 S (if i;j 2 N n S the preferences should be reversed); (v;i) Â (v¤
S;i)a n d
(v¤
S;j) Á (v;j), again the assumption expresses the intensity of these desirabilities.
As an alternative to transfer* or symmetric gain-loss*, the following axiom, that is not
the translation of any of the axioms reviewed in Section 2 and is stronger than transfer*
as shown in Proposition 1, has a clear and compelling interpretation. Thus, it can either
replace or justify any of the two former axioms in the characterizing theorem.
Coalitional Expectations Dependence (CED): For all l;l0 2 L(SGn £N)w i t hs u p -






l0(v;i)v ) l » l0:
11This axiom requires that the ranking of lotteries in which the position is sure depends
exclusively on the coalitional expectations of being winning. In other words, two lotteries
in which the same position is sure and that assign to each coalition the same probability
of being winning should be considered indi®erent. Dubey and Shapley (1979) point out
that this property, though they do not state it in general terms, would justify transfer.
Also Roth (1977b) alludes to this property being satis¯ed by the lotteries involved in his
neutrality to ordinary risk. Also note that the left-hand side of the implication is an
equality on games in the convex hull of simple superadditive games not on lotteries4.T h i s
equality holds if and only if in the lotteries on SGn, ©v2SGnl(v;i)v and ©v2SGnl0(v;i)v
the expectation of any coalition of being winning is the same. The axiom postulates
the indi®erence of l and l0 in such a case. This condition seems quite natural. In the
usual domain SGn power indices rank games, each of them consisting of a list of winning
coalitions. Now, when the role is ¯xed, to each lottery on SGn is associated a list in which
each coalition is winning with some probability. Coalitional expectation dependence just
requires that this list is what determines the ranking of a lottery.
The following propositions establish the relationships between the former axioms.
Proposition 1 Coalitional expectations dependence (CED) implies transfer* (T*).
Proof. Let v;w 2 SGn; and S 2 M(v) \ M(w)( S 6= N). Just observe that for all






2w(T): Indeed, if T 6= S : v(T)=v¤
S(T)a n d
w(T)=w¤
S(T); and if T = S : v(T)=w(T)=1a n dv¤
S(T)=w¤







2(w;i) for all i 2 N:
Proposition 2 Any von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) ordering satisfying anonymity*
(An*) and transfer* (T*), satis¯es symmetric gain-loss* (SymGL*).
Proof. Let v 2 SGn; and S 2 M(v)( S 6= N): First note that for any permutation ¼ of
N,( ¼v)¤
S = ¼(v¤
¼S): Now let i;j 2 S; and let ¼ the permutation interchanging i and j.
Then S = ¼S,s ot h a tS 2 M(v) \ M(¼v)a n d( ¼v)¤
S = ¼(v¤
¼S)=¼(v¤























2(v;j): The case i;j 2 N n S is
entirely similar.
Observe that only through the implied "sustitutivity" the VNM assumption has played
a role in the proof of the previous proposition. In Laruelle and Valenciano (1999) an
4In fact, this axiom is an explicit statement of the assumption underlying our identi¯cation of L(SGn)
and Co(SGn) in Laruelle and Valenciano (1998).
12example shows that under anonymity transfer is strictly stronger than symmetric gain-
l o s s .T h es a m ee x a m p l ec a nb ea d a p t e dt os h o wt h a tt h ec o n v e r s eo fP r o p o s i t i o n2f o rT *
and SymGL* is not true.
Finally the following axioms, interpretable as di®erent forms of indi®erence through
the veil of ignorance, are the translations into this setting of our di®erentiating axioms,
total and average gain-loss balance.
Absolute Indi®erence under the Veil of Ignorance (AIVI): For all v 2 SGn,a n d












This axiom postulates the indi®erence between playing v or v¤
S when all positions
are equally probable. In fact, it can be easily seen that it is equivalent to stating the
indi®erence of playing any two games when all roles are equally probable. For it, just
note that whatever the game v, by dropping minimal winning coalitions one each time
the unanimity game uN is ¯nally reached. So, by repeatedly applying the axiom it follows
that when all roles are equally probable v and uN, and consequently any two games, are
indi®erent. This is in fact the natural counterpart of "e±ciency" once stripped of its
normalizing ingredients and translated to Roth's setting.
Conditional Indi®erence under the Veil of Ignorance (CIVI): For all v 2 SGn,



































This axiom postulates the indi®erence between playing v or v¤
S when it is equally
probable to play a role in S or in N n S, and all roles are equally probable within each of
these coalitions. In other words, now it is indi®erent to play v or v¤
S if the way of assigning
the role is the following: ¯rst, a coin is tossed to choose S or N n S,t h e nar o l ei sc h o s e n
at random in the previously chosen coalition.
To make more clear a comparison between these two di®erent attitudes facing the veil
of ignorance, observe that both conditions are particular cases of the following principle:
























for some collection ¸ =( ¸s)s=1;2::;n¡1,w i t h¸s 2 (0;1):
AIVI is the particular case ¸s = s
n; while CIVI is the particular case ¸s = 1
2.T h a t
is, assuming all roles in S and N n S are equally probable, the indi®erence between v
13and v¤
S depends on the way of choosing between S and N n S. Ceteris paribus, from
CIVI's point of view what matters is to be or not to be in S. While according to AIVI
the size of the coalition matters too. More precisely, according to AIVI it is as if all the
advantage of being or not in S or N n S were to be ¯nally assigned to only one player in
the coalition chosen at random. So that the importance of being in the right coalition has
to be inversely weighted by its size.
Before proceeding with the main result, let us see that the former axioms, except
coalitional expectations dependence, are one by one the exact translation into Roth's
setting of the axioms reviewed in Section 2.
Proposition 3 Let ©:SGn ! Rn and ' : SGn £ N ! R; such that ©i(v)='(v;i) for
all (v;i) 2 SGn £ N: Then © satis¯es any of the following conditions: An, NP, SymGL,
T, TGLB or AGLB, if and only if ¹¹ ' satis¯es the corresponding condition, that is, An*,
NP*, SymGL*, T*, AIVI or CIVI, respectively.
Proof. Let ©i(v)='(v;i) for all (v;i) 2 SGn £ N: First, the following two equivalences
are straightforward.
(An/An*): © satis¯es An ,¹ ¹ ' satis¯es An*.
(NP/NP*): © satis¯es NP ,¹ ¹ ' satis¯es NP*.
Now let us check the others one by one.
(SymGL/SymGL*): Let v 2 SGn, S 2 M(v)( S 6= N), and i;j 2 S (resp., i;j 2 N n S).
Then the following equivalences are immediate:
©i(v) ¡ ©i(v¤
S)=© j(v) ¡ ©j(v¤















































(T/T*): Let v;w 2 SGn;S2 M(v) \ M(w)( S 6= N); and i 2 N
©i(v) ¡ ©i(v¤
S)=© i(w) ¡ ©i(w¤























































































































































































































Now we can state the main result in this paper.
Theorem 3 There exists a unique von Neumann-Morgenstern ordering in L(SGn £ N)
that satis¯es An*, NP*, SymGL* (or T* or CED) and absolute indi®erence under the veil
of ignorance (AIVI) (resp., conditional indi®erence under the veil of ignorance (CIVI)).
Moreover it is the one represented by the utility function
sh(v;i): =Shi(v) (resp., bz(v;i): =Bzi(v)).
Proof. It is now an easy corollary of Theorem 2 and Propositions 1, 2 and 3. Let ¹ be
a preference ordering in L(SGn £ N) represented by ' : SGn £ N ! R.A n dl e t©g i v e n
by ©i(v)='(v;i); for all v in SGn and all i =1 ;2::;n: T h e n ,i nv i e wo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 ,
¹ satis¯es An*, NP*, SymGL* (T*) and AIVI (resp., CIVI) if and only if © satis¯es An,
N P ,S y m G L( T )a n dT G L B( r e s p . ,A G L B ) .A n db yT h e o r e m2t h i sw i l lb es oi fa n do n l y
if it is © = ®Sh + ·1 (resp., © = ®Bz + ·1,) for some ®>0a n d· 2 R.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
if and only if '(v;i)=®sh(v;i)+· (resp., '(v;i)=®bz(v;i)+·). Thus, if and only if ¹
coincides with the VNM preferences represented by sh (resp., bz).
In case of assuming CED instead of T* or SymGL* note that, on the one hand,
this condition implies T* (Proposition 1). Conversely, if ¹ is the VNM preference on
15L(SGn £ N) represented by sh(v;i): =Shi(v) (the case bz(v;i): =Bzi(v)i se n t i r e l y





















l0(v;i)sh(v;i): That is to say sh(l)=sh(l0);
i.e., l » l0.T h u s¹ veri¯es CED.
5C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S
As a ¯rst conclusion of this work we want to emphasize and vindicate Roth's (1977b,
1988) approach. We think that Roth's setting is particularly appropriate for a better
understanding of the nature of power indices: Power indices should be understood as
comparative assessments of the power attached to roles or positions in collective decision
procedures modeled as simple superadditive games. In this context even the words "'i(v)
represents the power of player i in game v", though correct, can be misleading. What
'i(v) evaluates is the ap r i o r icapacity to in°uencing the outcome in any collective decision
process modeled by game v of the player, whoever she or he be, that sits on seat i,o r
plays role i; in game v, and whatever the issue at stake. What are evaluated are roles or
positions in collective decision procedures. To formalize this idea, Roth's setting seems
the most suitable.
Roth's approach provides a point of view under which the non game-theoretical nature
of power indices is conspicuous. There are no players, there are no strategies, no cake to
share, no cooperation, no competition. Just roles in voting rules to be ranked. Even
the TU framework is conceptually super°uous. When simple superadditive games are
used to represent decision-making procedures, the only relevant information attached to
the worth of a coalition is whether it is winning or not. The assumption of transferable
utility that seems to underlie this model is unnecessary and out of place in this context.
Consequently, if simple superadditive games are interpreted as models of voting rules,
power indices should be interpreted and axiomatized accordingly, without attaching special
meaning to the numerical worth of the coalitions beyond the dichotomy winning/losing.
While solutions of cooperative TU games are aimed to give the utilities that players should
expect, power measures are aimed to give a ranking of the roles or positions in collective
decision procedures.
16Apart from this basic coincidence with Roth's (1977b, 1988) approach we want to
stress some discrepancies. As discussed in Section 3, Roth's interpretation of his di®er-
entiating axioms, "neutrality/aversion to strategic risk," is particularly inconsistent with
the interpretation of power indices as utility functions representing expected utility pref-
erences on roles in voting rules. On the other hand, the justi¯cation of "e±ciency" of
the resulting utility function in this context for the Shapley-Shubik preference ordering
remains unavoidably obscure in Roth's (1977b, 1988). It just appears as an unaccountable
consequence of the other axioms.
Instead, the translation of our axioms, that characterize either index up to a zero and a
unit in the domain of simple superadditive games in Laruelle and Valenciano (1999), into
this setting turns out clear and natural. In particular, in our systems both di®erentiating
axioms express two di®erent attitudes toward risk facing the veil of ignorance, in a context
in which Rawls' concept seems especially suitable. Our "absolute indi®erence under the
veil of ignorance" appears as the natural counterpart in Roth's setting of the up to now
obscure "e±ciency" in this context, once stripped of its normalizing ingredients. While
our "conditional indi®erence under the veil of ignorance" captures in similar terms the
risk posture underlying the Banzhaf index.
It is not clear which of the two attitudes under the veil of ignorance is more plausi-
ble. But a direct consequence of absolute indi®erence under the veil of ignorance is that
all games are indi®erent when all roles are equally probable. This entails that all sym-
metric games, in which all roles are interchangeable, are considered indi®erent. In other
words, assuming anonymity*, absolute indi®erence under the veil of ignorance, the axiom
that di®erentiates Shapley-Shubik's preferences, entails, for instance, that the all-player's
unanimity decision rule and the simple majority rule are considered indi®erent. But this
contradicts the usual common sense view.
Finally we want to point out some lines of further research. First, possibly the results
presented here can be extended to semivalues and probabilistic values in general, in the
domain of simple superadditive games at least. Second, usually simple games have received
less attention than general TU games. Values and axiomatizations are ¯rst thought for the
wider domain and only afterwards restricted or adapted to the particular case of simple
games. It could be interesting for a change to do the opposite. Can our axioms be extended
or adapted for general TU games in either the usual or Roth's set up? The answer is yes,
but do they keep their characterizing power?
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